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PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
FILIATION

For the third consecutive year, the Louisiana Legislature has
amended Louisiana Civil Code article 209,' providing for proof of filiation by an illegitimate child. The most recent amendment increases
the burden of proof imposed upon the illegitimate child whose alleged
parent has died. In a civil proceeding instituted to establish filiation
to the dead parent, the child must prove filiation by "clear and convincing" evidence. In contrast, the illegitimate child whose alleged parent
is living must prove filiation by a simple preponderance of the evidence.
The difference in the burdens of persuasion is described most often
as follows: preponderance of the evidence is proof "that the existence
of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence"2 and
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1. 1981 La. Acts, No.' 720, S 1.
See Harlaux v. Harlaux, 411 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs granted, 414 So.
2d 380 (La. 1982). In the Harlaux case the court of appeal interpreted section 4 of
Act 549 of 1980, which permitted illegitimate children nineteen years or older to institute an action to establish filiation for one year from the effective date of the Act
(July 23, 1980). The purpose of the section was to provide illegitimate children prohibited from instituting the action under the peremptive period provided by article
209 one year in which to file an action to establish filiation. The First Circuit Court
of Appeal interpreted the section as permitting only illegitimate children nineteen
years or older whose parent had not died more than six months before one year to bring
the action. The court opined:
This conclusion is reached because there is no mention of the dispensation of
the death provision in favor of any child not yet-eighteen, nor older than nineteen, who is not afforded the benefits of the grace period. Stated another way,
if a child is ten years old, but the alleged parent has been dead for more than
six months, then a suit to prove filiation cannot be commenced. We cannot conceive that the legislature would have intended a different result for someone over
nineteen years vis-a-vis someone under nineteen years.
411 So. 2d at 584. As to the last observation made by the court of appeal, see Spaht,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Persons, 41 LA. L. REV. 372, 387 (1981):
The one-year period provided an illegitimate to assert filiation in a civil proceeding
seems reasonable except as applied to a child who is under the age of nineteen
and whose alleged parent has been dead for more than six months. In the latter
case, the child, or his tutor on his behalf, is effectively denied any succession
rights possibly created by Succession of Brown.
2. V. BALL, R. BARNHART, K. BROWN, G. DIx, E. GELHOURN, R. MEISENHOLDER, E.
ROBERTS, & J. STRONG, MCCoRMICK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 794 (2d ed. 1972).
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clear and convincing evidence is proof that the contested fact is "highly
probable."3
At least one recent case4 involving proof of paternity under article 209(1),' before its amendment in 1980, indicates that establishing
filiation by a preponderance of the evidence' requires private
acknowledgements in conversation to be of a "continuous, habitual
and unequivocal nature."7 In IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson,' the
evidence offered by the alleged illegitimate child consisted of the
following: "(1) hearsay knowledge and purported general rumor
evidence in the community from mostly unnamed sources; (2) hearsay
declarations of her deceased mother; and (3) two purported questionable oral 'acknowledgments.' "" In opposition to the child's evidence,
there was offered: (1) testimony of the opposing parties; (2) the
presumption that the alleged child was the child of the husband of
her mother;"0 (3) evidence that other men were involved with the
mother at the time of the child's conception; (4) evidence that there
was no birth certificate or private writings of the alleged father
3. Id. at 796.
4. IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson, 419 So. 2d 490 (La App. 2d Cir. 1982).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209(1) (prior to 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, S 1):
In the case where the proof of paternal descent is authorized by the preceding
article, the proof may be made in either of the following ways:
1. By all kinds of private writings, in which the father may have acknowledged
the bastard as his child, or may have called him so; ....
6. The court accepted the definition of preponderance- of the evidence quoted
in MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, and the court cited as authority
Prestenbach v. Sentry Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1976).
7. No. 14,777, slip op. at 31.
8. 419 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
9. Id., slip op. at 32.
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 184. In footnote 5 of the Henderson opinion, the court suggests that the application of the presumption that the husband of the mother is the
father of a child conceived during the marriage may raise problems when the child
institutes an action to establish filiation to someone other than the husband of the
mother:
Under the past and present state of the law, Waverly Markham is nonetheless
presumed to be the legal father of Rayvenita Thomas. Thus, as the law now exists, unless the present Article 208 prohibits a presumed legitimate child from
proving paternal filiation as other than that of the child of its presumed father,
which may be contrary to Succession of Mitchell and Warren v. Richard, infra,
the standard of proof for a husband to disavow a child is more stringent than
that afforded a child presumed legitimate, as in the instant case, to prove its
biological father is someone other than the presumed father.
No. 14,777, slip op. at n.5.
The fact that Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975), and Warren v. Richard,
296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974), produced the result described above by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal was foreseen in Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged,
37 LA. L. REV. 59, 72-73 (1976). See also a commentary on the interpretation of 1981
La. Acts, No. 720, S 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, in which the author suggests
that a child entitled to legitimate filiation may not institute an action to establish
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acknowledging his paternity; (5) evidence that there was no rearing
of the child in the home of the alleged father, or education or support
by him; (6) no evidence that the alleged father and mother lived in
open concubinage; and (7) evidence of no formal acknowledgment.
Therefore, the child failed to establish that her filiation to the alleged
father was more probable than not. Since the alleged father was
deceased, the new legislation would require the child to establish that
the fact of her filiation was "highly probable." The newly enacted
statute should withstand constitutional challenge. Arguably, the
distinction among illegitimates, a classification recognized in Succession of Robins," has a rational basis. The legitimate state interest involved is in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims, and the statute is
closely tailored to effectuate those interests. After the death of the
alleged parent, whose knowledge concerning the fact or probability
of his filiation to the child is superior, the vulnerability to fraudulent
claims is significantly increased. Therefore, the state's imposition of
a more stringent burden of proof to establish filiation is directly
related to assuring only legitimate claims against the alleged parent's
succession.
In Mills v. Habluetzel,2 a Texas statute requiring an illegitimate
child to file a suit to establish paternity before the child was one year
old was declared unconstitutional. Although recognizing that the state
may adopt different procedures for illegitimate and legitimate
children 3 seeking support from an alleged father, the United States
Supreme Court stated, "The State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims will justify those periods of limitation that are sufficiently long to present a real threat of loss or diminution of evidence, or an increased vulnerability to fraudulent claims." 4
filiation. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Persons,42 LA. L. REV. 403, 405-407
(1982).
11. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977). The Louisiana Supreme Court therein interpreted
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1488, which prohibited testamentary dispositions to the testator's
adulterous or incestuous bastards.
12. 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982). See also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
13. Paternal support suits on behalf of illegitimate children contain an element
that such suits for legitimate children do not contain: proof of paternity. Such
proof is often sketchy and strongly contested, frequently turning upon conficting
testimony from only two witnesses. Indeed, the problems of proving paternity have
been recognized repeatedly by this Court.
102 S. Ct. at 1553-54 (emphasis added). But cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 891, which permits
a parent to establish filiation:
A parent, for purposes of this and the following article, includes one who is
legitimately filiated to the deceased or who is filiated by legitimation or
acknowledgment under Article 203 or by judgment under Article 209 or who has
openly and notoriously treated the child as his own and has not refused to support him.
14. 102 S. Ct. at 1554-55.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the unrealistically short
time limitation was not substantially related to the state's interest
in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims; in fact, the
Supreme Court observed that the statutory time period so restricted
the rights of the illegitimate child as to effectively deny them. Louisiana's statutory distinctions concerning the burden of proof of filiation of an illegitimate child are directly related to achieving a
legitimate state purpose and do not so restrict the right as to deny
it under the most recent pronunciations of the United States Supreme
Court.
The determination of the actions to which the new statute applies
raises fundamental questions concerning retroactivity and constitutional application of the amended statute. The significance of this
determination in part lies in the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Succession of Clivens,"5 which will determine whether Succession of Broum"' is retroactive. Initially, the statutory change in article 209 appears procedural in nature; it effects a change in the evidentiary burden of persuasion in filiation actions when the alleged parent
is dead. If the amended statute is procedural or remedial, it may be
applied to those causes of action which have accrued or are pending,
as well as to future litigation, in the absence of contrary language."
No language in Act 527 of 1982 expresses the legislative intent that
the statute, as amended, shall apply prospectively only.
Yet, when considering the effect of amendments to the Civil Code
articles concerning the presumption that the husband of the mother
is the father of the child conceived or born during marriage," the
Louisiana Supreme Court identified the statutory changes as "affecting substantive rights." 9 The status of a child born during marriage
and entitled to the presumption of legitimacy "is a matter of substance
of the utmost import considering it involves not only legitimacy but
the right of inheritance.""0 By analogy, as this author has observed
before,2 the right to establish filiation under articles 208 and 209 "affects" substantive rights. Therefore, an amendment to the statute may
15. __ So. 2d -,
No. 82-C-0125 (La. July 2, 1982), reh'g granted, Sept. 3, 1982.
16. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
17. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d
417 (1953); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197. So. 566 (1940);
West v. State, Supt. of Pub. Educ. & State Bd. of Educ., 356 So. 2d 1015 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977); Hammond Asphalt Co. v. Joiner, 270 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972);
Pelloat v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 175 So. 2d 656 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), writ refused, 248 La. 122, 176 So. 2d 452 (1965).
18. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 184-189, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430, S 1.
19. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1979).
20.

Id.

21.

Spaht, supra note 10, at 410.
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not be accorded retrospective application "unless it contains language
expressly indicative of legislative intent' to make it retroactive and
then only when constitutional guarantees such as due process, vested
rights and the inviolability of contracts will not be adversely affected
thereby."' The legislature did not express an intention that the statute
be applied retrospectively, so the statute as amended should apply
only to actions commenced after its effective date-September 10,
1982.
In addition to amending article 209 on proof of filiation, the
legislature enacted a provision requiring the clerk of court to record
in the conveyance records every judgment of filiation rendered by
the court adjudging a father the parent of the child.n The judgment
of filiation so recorded "shall be effective against third persons from
the date of recordation."'" The recordation provision imposes the
obligation on the clerk of court to record a judgment of filiation when
a father is adjudged a parent, but not when a mother is so adjudged.
The illegitimate child who is not formally acknowledged or legitimated
must establish his filiation to both mother and father by a judgment
rendered in accordance with article 209. The distinction drawn between judgments obtained against the father and those obtained
against the mother may engender constitutional questions, since only
the former must be recorded. The provision further distinguishes
among illegitimate children since those whose filiation is established
by legitimation25 or formal acknowledgment," rather than a judgment,
need not record the respective acts. To analyze the constitutionality
of, the distinctions drawn by the statute, it is necessary to determine
what objective was sought to be achieved by the recordation provision.
The clerk of court is mandated to record in the conveyance records
all judgments of filiation adjudging a father the parent of a child.
However, Code of Civil Procedure article 74.1 permits the action to
establish filiation to be instituted in the parish: (1) of the child's
domicile; (2) where conception occurred; (3) where either parent resided
at the time of conception; (4) where an act of acknowledgment occurred; or (5) where the birth of the child occurred. Since the clerk of
court is required to record the judgment in the conveyance records,
presumably the statute was intended to have some effect on immovable property. However, the parish of proper venue may not be
the parish where immovable property belonging to the father is
located.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

377 So. 2d at 1198.
LA. R.S. 13:914.1, added by 1982 La. Acts, No. 425, § 1.
Id.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 198 & 200.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 203.
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The judgment is effective against third persons from the date of
recordation, yet the statute does not specifically state that the judgment will have no effect as to third persons if it is not recorded. The
purpose of the recordation requirement may have been to insure that
the judgment of filiation be considered as a judgment "affecting immovable property." Under Civil Code article 2266, an unrecorded judgment affecting immovable property is null and void as to third parties.
What effect does the judgment of filiation have on purchasers of
immovable property owned by the father? Establishing the relationship of a child to the owner of immovable property will have no effect generally until the father's death. A third person considering the
purchase of property after the father's death probably will not do
so until there has been a judgment of possession rendered recognizing the heirs as owners of the property. If the illegitimate child has
obtained a judgment of filiation against the father, which judgment
has been recorded, the third-party purchaser will be subject to a claim
by the child, even though the child is not recognized as heir in the
judgment of possession. The recorded judgment of filiation affects third
persons. Furthermore, under another statute, the illegitimate child
with an unrecorded judgment of filiation has a right to claim an interest in the property from the third person who acquired the property by onerous title within two years from the judgment of
possession." At the expiration of the two-year period, by legislation
passed in 1982, the third person acquires the property as owner by
the operation of acquisitive prescription. 8 Presumably, the right of
the illegitimate child to claim an interest in the property is terminated
at the expiration of the two-year period, whether his judgment of filiation was recorded or not, since the third person acquiring under the
statute need not be in good faith.
If under Civil Code article 2266 an unrecorded judgment of filiation is null and void as to third persons, a purchaser from the other
heirs could argue immunity from an action brought by the illegitimate
child, even if it is filed within the two-year period provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5630. Furthermore, a donee of property which
belonged to a deceased, unprotected by the two-year acquisitive
27. LA. R.S. 9:5630(A) (1950), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 721, S 1.
28. This Section establishes an acquisitive prescription, and shall be applied both
retrospectively and prospectively; however, any person whose rights would be
adversely affected by this Section shall have one year from September 11, 1981
within which to assert the action described in Subsection A of this Section and
if no such action is instituted within that time, such claim shall be forever barred.
LA. R.S. 9:5630(B) (1950), as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 37, S 1. In the comment to
the legislation it is observed: "The amendment strengthens the position of acquirers
of property as it affords protection to them not only against suits of omitted heirs
but also against suits by third persons."
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prescription of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5630, would contend that
he is free from any claim by the child whose judgment is unrecorded,
since as to him it is null and void.
Whether the statute concerning recordation of the judgment can
be interpreted as modifying the substantive right of the unrecognized
successor to assert an interest in property is doubtful. If so interpreted, the possibility of constitutional infirmity again emerges. Consider the illegitimate child under the age of nineteen whose parent
dies. He has one year within which to bring an action to establish
filiation,' which he can cumulate with an action against the other heirs
and third parties to be recognized as an heir "with a claim of interest
in the property of the decedent's succession."' Assume the other heirs
had obtained a judgment of possession and sold the property to a
third person. If Civil Code article 2266 is interpreted to render void
an unrecorded judgment of filiation, the illegitimate child-who is not
required to obtain a judgment at any earlier time, nor to record ithas no right to assert an interest in the immovable property.
Denying the right to pursue immovable property in the hands of
third persons to a class of illegitimates who must obtain a judgment
of filiation seems constitutionally infirm. This constitutional infirmity
probably cannot be cured by arguments that the illegitimate, although
denied an interest in the property, still has a cause of action against
the other heirs." The interests of third parties-the primary concern
of such state interests as orderly devolution of property and stability
of lana titles-are already served adequately by requiring the child:
(1) to obtain the judgment of filiation and (2) to assert his interest
against third persons within two years from the judgment of
possession.

29. The proceeding required by this Article must be brought within one year of
the death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth,
whichever first occurs. This time limitation shall run against all persons, including
minors and interdicts. If the proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may
not thereafter establish his filiation.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 209(C), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, S 1.
30. Smith v. Stephens, 412 So. 2d 570, 573 (La. 1982). In support of this proposition, the supreme court cited LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 462 & 463. Smith v. Stephens was
cited and distinguished by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Bissic,
So. 2d , No. 14,925 (La. App. 2d Cir. June 15, 1982).
31. If after the partition an heir appears, whose death has been presumed on
account of his long absence, or whose right was not known, as if a second testament unknown, until then, should entitle him to inherit with the others, the first
partition must be annulled, and another must be made of all the property remaining in kind, and of the value of whatever has been consumed or alienated,
in order that he may have the share of the whole to which he is entitled.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1381.

